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Abstract
A debate raged in several South African newspapers in November 2007 around whether 
poverty levels had increased over 13 years of democracy and a black government. The con-
troversy arose after the release of research findings by the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR) that the number of poor people had more than doubled between 1996 and 
2005. The politicisation of the debate largely reflected the sensitivity of the government at 
the time, and this permeated the construction of various arguments. In the end, however, the 
controversy was inconclusive and it was subsequently “eclipsed” by developments outside 
the media. The experience points to the relations between press and society in transitional 
society, and especially to poor performance of the press in regard to coverage of a matter 
that is both complex and of critical social importance. 
Keywords: South Africa, journalistic failure, poverty, political transition, reporting statis-
tics, primary definers
Introduction
South African post-apartheid politics have seen much political contestation on the terrain 
of which political force best addresses poverty. President Thabo Mbeki who resigned 
in September 2008 had staked much of his reputation on this score, while his chief 
opponent and former comrade in the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Jacob 
Zuma, has portrayed himself as a victim of Mbeki’s political machinations because of 
his compassion for the poor (see, for instance, The Star, January 2008). The historical 
and electoral rhetoric of the ANC is pro-poor, and is a reaction to the continuing un-
derdevelopment of the majority population that owes its roots to the apartheid political 
economy. But both the political left and the right have tried to paint the Mbeki govern-
ment as falling short on the ‘delivery’ of ‘development’, and their critique evoked vehe-
ment denials by the authorities who instead pointed to major progress across a range of 
poverty fronts. This defensive response by those in power was not surprising because 
the criticism implies that either they act in the interests of ‘fat cats’ and don’t really 
‘give a damn’ about the poor, or that they are inept in trying to uplift the downtrodden. 
Both views resonate with racist stereotypes of black rulers, thereby giving the issue a 
super-charge – especially when the criticism of government emanates from sources as-
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sociated with white advantage. While racial stereotypes have been researched in terms 
of representations of the poor (see Bullock et al 2001), here the focus was on the race 
of those presented as responsible for addressing the plight of the poor (and on the race 
of their accusers as well – see below). In this general context, the Mbeki government 
proved especially prickly about the SAIRR research which appeared a month before the 
watershed annual conference of the ANC in December 2007. The incumbents foresaw 
(correctly) that they would be vulnerable to challenge by left-leaning groups rallying 
under a populist banner seeking to replace Mbeki with Zuma as party president.
It was in its annual survey released in November 2007 that the SAIRR claimed there 
had been increased poverty under Mbeki’s watch, highlighting this particular focus in a 
press release at the time. The Institute is susceptible to being characterised as reflecting 
white interests because of its own demographic make-up and also because – despite 
its liberal history – it supported the rightwing Inkatha Freedom Party (then a bellicose 
force with many murderous members) against the ANC, during the 1980s and early 
1990s. The poverty claim from the baggage-laden Institute appeared in the political 
context outlined above, and it unsurprisingly triggered a controversy of note. Multiple 
discourses can surround a social issue like poverty (Summers 2006: 13), and this proved 
to be the case here. 
In a nutshell, the Institute’s claim was that whereas in 1996, there were 1.9 million 
South Africans living on less than the equivalent of a dollar-a-day, by 2005 this number 
had escalated to 4.2 million. The controversy that erupted around this finding might 
have been predicted. Government had, years earlier, reacted strongly to a ‘battering’ in 
the media, when figures released by the UNDP (2003) highlighted poor performance 
on poverty alleviation. And during 2007 itself, an article in the Sunday Independent (18 
February) signalled the contentiousness of issue. Under the headline “Poverty is dif-
ficult to quantify, let alone end”, journalist Patrick Laurence reported that the SAIRR 
was researching the issue and that its dollar-a-day yardstick meant there were 4.3 mil-
lion people defined as poor in 2004. He also noted the higher benchmark of “relative 
poverty” which pointed to 23.5 million poor people in the same year. His article did not, 
however, compare this data to previous years, which was the key provocative dimension 
of the November SAIRR release. Also prior to the debate proper, but helping to set the 
stage, letters in June to Business Day deliberated on whether the SAIRR was a racist 
organisation, following an initial missive penned by a pro-government writer that was 
published under the headline: “Institute stands for doom, gloom”. In short, the research 
did not come into a vacuum, and nor did it hail from a source with an unassailable im-
age of a neutral research agency. 
The poverty row ran throughout November 2007, and newspapers were a key platform 
for contestation (see Table 1). 
The voices heard in the debate were largely those of the SAIRR, government and 
researchers. Overall, there was a predominance of SAIRR representatives in the joust-
ing, often with the last word. No trade unions or NGOs dealing with welfare issues 
were presented. Further, that no-one in the press appears to have seen fit to canvass poor 
people and publish how they perceived the issue, indicates that this was a dispute within 
the elite about the poor. This omission of poor people is not surprising in the light of 
research elsewhere (eg. Devereux 1998), and also because the media in this particular 
case do tend to be fairly elitist – such as Business Day, where much of the debate took 
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place. But the effect was that poor people were rendered voiceless and without agency, 
and also as lacking in responsibility for their condition. Other research has observed 
that such voices of the poor are largely absent within South Africa media reportage on 
general policy issues (see Banda 2007a, Berger 2007, 2008). Echoing findings of one 
study (Banda 2007b), the coverage in the SAIRR case presented a sanitised, reified 
picture that was often far removed from actual experiences of poverty. 
Significantly, another absent constituency in the whole debate was the business 
sector, suggesting implicitly that, while the controversy was signalled as relevant to 
business readers, business itself had no views on, or implication in, poverty trends. A 
symptomatically myopic paradigm thus seems to have informed both the media and the 
business community in regard to this debate.
However, journalists were also conspicuously absent from the substantive discussion 
– entering only in news reports, a few editorial comments, and very rare opinion pieces. 
Instead, the most ‘meaty’ arguments were presented unmediated in the form of opinion 
pieces by outsiders to the press. Additional points were evident in published letters to 
the editor. Not many newspapers seem to have foreseen that this story would become a 
rolling issue nor one that deserved more thoughtful journalistic engagement. Thus no 
articles were found that would count as a round-up of the debate or a meta-analysis of 
the positions, although such should be legitimately expected to be a contribution to the 
coverage by journalists themselves. There was therefore no clear or credible resolution 
for readers who followed the coverage (probably in piecemeal fashion).
Journalists stood accused of subtracting value during the debate. Although the debate 
became one of government performance on poverty, it also indirectly revealed a lot about 
press performance in covering the major issue at hand. The basic role of the press being 
a neutral simple information conduit was evident in, and limited to, early news articles 
about the SAIRR report and government reaction to it. Even here, the inadequacies of 
journalism were hammered. As pointed out by analyst Steven Friedman on a newspaper 
website, the media simply regurgitated the SAIRR’s claims without scrutiny or balance. 
He criticised reporters for not asking “basic questions” of the SAIRR about how the 
findings were reached, and for not asking other experts for their views. Ken Owen, a 
former editor, expressed his hope in a letter that “in future the newspapers will be more 
circumspect in publishing material from the institute without checking it”. An official 
at the quasi-governmental Human Sciences Research Council, Miriam Altman, used her 
opinion piece to lay into “poorly researched journalism”. As often happens in political 
debates, the media serves as a scapegoat and is partly blamed for the controversy. In 
this case, however, the critiques of media performance were not unwarranted. There 
was no acting as a watchdog in terms of independent scrutiny of the claims being made 
on any side of the debate. Even less did the press act as an educator in its own right, 
explaining the issues. Instead, the lack of journalistic intervention meant a discourse of 
incomparable statistics, substantial jargon and more confusion than illumination. The 
debate remained at the level of “he said, she said” representation. 
Thus, most coverage appears to have been in the form of reactions to, and by, elites 
external to the press who were keen to join the debate, rather than journalists pro-actively 
soliciting (diverse) participation. To this extent, the press did act as a forum and site of 
contestation, although in so doing it also did not go beyond reflecting the agenda, viz. 
that there was a dispute over government’s poverty performance. However, inasmuch 
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as SAIRR voices were predominant, it can also be postulated that the press also played 
a role as a fairly passive vehicle for institutional public relations. 
Many participants were long-standing and predictable institutional commentators, and 
private individuals’ voices only appeared (although did not predominate) in the letters. It 
has been suggested in a different context that in poverty reportage the opinions of expert 
sources are considered both authoritative and morally legitimate (Bessant 1997; Kelly 
1996, cited by Kitchener and Vandermensbrugghe, 2008). Interestingly in this SAIRR 
controversy, the “experts” could not all be presented in this way – given their differences, 
racial colouring and political loading of the controversy. However, overall there was an 
uncritical legitimation of elite institutional voices as the primary stakeholders in the debate 
– something that clashed visibly with extra-media developments (see below).
In short, as will be seen below, within the elite ‘bubble’ of debate, rather than jour-
nalists being “primary definers” of the issues (Hall et al 1978: 58-9), that role fell to 
participants with specific axes to grind. 
Research Findings
The data for this article consist of 25 items published in the mainstream media. A total 
of 13 appeared in Business Day and its Saturday edition – The Weekender. Three arti-
cles were editorial comments by publications, and only three items were actually news 
stories. Eight were letters and eleven were opinion pieces. Three of the opinion pieces 
were by government representatives, and three from the SAIRR, but a total of seven 
of the 25 items were direct from the SAIRR (four being letters). Of the remaining five 
opinion pieces, two took the SAIRR figures for granted, two challenged them, and one 
tried to rise above the debate. 
The coverage began with news items and a few editorial comments, followed by 
opinion pieces, a flurry of letters, more opinion pieces and then more letters. Battle 
was enjoined early on when Mbeki strongly criticised the SAIRR in his (then) weekly 
online newsletter as (then) head of the ANC. His arguments were political, conceptual 
(the measurement of poverty) and about research method (statistical sourcing and data 
interpretation). Various contributors, through opinion pieces and letters, then came out 
in support of him or criticised the SAIRR. The Institute itself was quick to retaliate in 
kind. Three contributions relatively late in the debate (a letter and two opinion pieces) 
tried to switch the agenda by arguing that the controversy was irrelevant. The status 
and significant demographics of the contributors, relevant to their standing and social 
credibility in South Africa, is as follows: white men 21, white women 1, black men 3. 
That the SAIRR findings constituted a political ‘hot potato’ was noted by The Week-
ender (24 November) which observed that “the argument is highly politically charged” 
and not the kind of information the government would want to hear on the eve of a 
tightly-fought leadership contest. The paper also charged that the SAIRR was ideo-
logically against the government’s policy of social welfare grants (a claim that was 
later rebutted by the SAIRR). However, the coverage itself also helped to heighten the 
politicisation of the debate through headlines which framed it as a conflict story, and 
indeed one that was also a personalised one. Examples are: “Mbeki attacks Institute of 
Race Relations” (Weekender, 17 November) and “President in war with race body over 
poverty” (City Press, 18 November). 
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Political rhetoric flowed amongst the participants, and without any balancing by less 
impassioned journalistic discourse. Mbeki said the Institute had positioned itself “as the 
liberal alternative to our movement”, and that its claims were a “canard” needing to be 
“chained”. He referred to “the pernicious tendency… to advance the particular agendas 
of forces that are opposed to our movement and the national democratic revolution”. The 
SAIRR, he continued, had chosen “to discover statistics that serve the political purpose 
of discrediting our movement and government…”. The Institute’s president Sipho Seepe 
wrote that Mbeki’s “tirade” was “fatally flawed”. He argued that the SAIRR “was in 
the business of doing research” rather than playing politics, and he accused Mbeki of 
reading only fragments of the Institute’s study. SAIRR official Frans Cronje also hit 
back at Mbeki’s criticism that the Institute was undermining the “national democratic 
revolution” by saying that the “revolution” could possibly even topple the Mbeki lead-
ership before the year’s end. In a published letter, Cronje wrote: “If SA’s recent history 
was one of simple ‘success’, Mbeki might not be staring an ANC branch-level revolt 
in the face next month.” 
If the debate was a wrestling match sans referee, what was particularly left unadju-
dicated was a dispute about the central matter of how to define poverty. This enabled 
the SAIRR’s Cronje to conclude: “If anything, the debate that followed the release of 
our figures suggests that South Africans cannot even agree on what poverty is, let alone 
whether it is going up or down.” The issue at stake was the Institute’s one dollar-a-day 
income definition which constituted the basis for its claims. The SAIRR said this was 
“the globally accepted measure of poverty”, and its president Sipho Seepe wrote that the 
dollar-a-day definition was “widely used by the United Nations and the World Bank”, 
and was also used for the UN’s Millenium Development Goals (MDGs).
By implication, Mbeki and others who questioned this measure were out of line with 
global orthodoxy. This accusation resonated with other representations of Mbeki as a 
denialist in international terms about HIV-Aids and the crisis in Zimbabwe. In addition, 
the Institute said that government could not eschew the dollar-a-day measure when it, 
itself, utilised the formula in its commitments on the MDGs. 
On the other hand, resort to ‘majoritarianism’ as an argument was also present on the 
government side in its own bid to discredit the SAIRR. Three contributors – govern-
ment’s Netshitenzhe, semi-official Altman and ex-editor Owen – said that the Institute’s 
findings were at odds with other poverty research results in South Africa. Responding 
directly to this was SAIRR official Cronje in an article headlined “Joblessness in SA and 
the poverty ‘consensus’”. In this, he volunteered the view that the difference between the 
Institute’s data and that published by others was “part of the reason that we published 
it”. He added: “On the charge that we are outside the consensus position, the institute 
is innately suspicious of such positions and, in any case, doubts that such consensus 
exists when it comes to poverty in SA.” In all these claims, there was no verification of 
the points of either the ‘majoritarians’ or Cronje. 
The SAIRR’s dollar-a-day benchmark was also contested for other reasons. On the 
government side, it was presented as being a false and simplistic “money-metric” con-
cept. Mbeki pushed instead for consideration of the “social wage” such as education, 
electricity, water supply, health, and housing services. In addition to this unresolved 
narrow vs multidimensional view of poverty, another controversial matter was what 
monies were taken into account even with the narrow definition. There was no resound-
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ing authoritative clarification of whether or not the SAIRR’s conclusions looked only at 
earned income under one dollar-a-day, and thereby left out other income (social grants 
and pensions) in regard to measuring “poverty”. This is a significant issue because, as 
stated by The Weekender, 12 million South Africans receive grants. Even the SAIRR’s 
Seepe noted that 25% of South African households “now get their greatest single source 
of income from the state” (Sunday Times, 25 November). But instead of the press produc-
ing any independent or convincing assessment of how these welfare monies compared to 
other income, and thence to the SAIRR figures, there was only a letter (late in the day) 
from the Institute’s Marco MacFarlane saying that this source of income was indeed 
included in the research. 
While the participants were weak on defining poverty, many did not hesitate to ex-
pand their comments to remarks on the sustainability of social welfare in general as a 
poverty-reduction strategy. This was not pursued in any depth however, and it was also 
never untangled as to the role of extra-governmental cash income within the mix of 
resources (cash and kind) available to poor people.
There was ‘journalistic failure’ not only on this issue, but also in regard to a part of 
the debate concerning what level of cash income defined people as poor. Government’s 
own figures cited by Mbeki and others defined poverty as people living on less than 
R3000 a year. Nowhere in the coverage was this recalculated at a daily rate so that it 
would be directly comparable to the $1 (R6.80) standard (it works out at R8.22 a day). 
On this measure, a very large number (some 19.5m) of South Africans count as poor. 
Another set of statistics marshalled in the contestation by government’s Joel Netshiten-
zhe, was sourced to the UNDP, with the measure of R354 a month. Again, there was no 
evening out of the apples and oranges. (The figure translates to R11.64 a day). By this 
measure, Netshitenzhe gave a figure of even more (circa 21 million) poor people over 
the period 1995-2002. 
Not directly addressed in the debate was the question of why government contested the 
SAIRR’s ‘mere’ 4.2 million figures, when its own alternative systems yielded five times 
more people as being poor. A close reading, however, shows that government preferred 
to rely on these higher figures of poverty because with this particular data it could also 
claim a reduction in poverty trends. The implicit position here was that even if the poorest 
section of the poor had increased (as per SAIRR claims), the statistics also showed that 
the general poor were nevertheless diminishing as a proportion of the population. On the 
government’s figures, this was a fall from 50.1% to 43.2% of population, and the UNDP 
ones the decline was from 51.1% to 48.5%. Again, apples and oranges persisted in the 
commentary, with no newspaper stepping forward with a common standard that would 
show the comparable percentage of population in the SAIRR figures. 
What further remained unresolved in this were the differences between proportions of 
the population, and absolute numbers. The SAIRR argued that even if, in government’s 
own terms, the percentage of the poor had dropped, the actual numbers of people in the 
below R3000 bracket had increased from 18.9 million to 20.5 million. It argued that 
this increase corresponded to a similar rise in unemployment figures during the period 
of their research. Missing in this aspect of the debate was any elaboration around the 
comparative significance of concentrating on percentages of population versus absolute 
numbers. Again, absent was any journalistic intervention that could have been helpful 
in progressing the debate. 
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In terms of the status of the statistics at the heart of the furore, it was unclear as to 
what could be relied upon. Para-governmental researcher Altman’s article implied that 
accurate data existed through its headline: “Poverty shock! (Never mind the facts)”. The 
Citizen’s Andrew Kenny, one of the rare journalists engaging in the debate, assumed the 
same in saying: “The SAIRR has an impeccable record of presenting accurate, unbiased 
information.” 
On the other hand, The Weekender (24 November) – another once-off journalistic 
participant – proposed that the figures did not prove either side right, but rather illus-
trated the poverty of the data. The paper supposed nonetheless that “it would be ex-
tremely surprising if the financial state of SA’s poorest 20% had increased, never mind 
doubled, over the past decade”. Further credibility was taken out of the whole scrap by 
five participants late in the debate (Altman, Netshitenzhe, Owen, and Neva Makgetla on 
the government side; Charles Simkins on the SAIRR side) who argued that none of the 
statistics and/or year comparisons could be sustained. A complete lack of confidence in 
the figures was also manifested in headlines such as: “Numbers, numbers everywhere 
and not a truth in sight?”; “Phony findings”; “Shoddy research”; “The pitfalls of poverty 
measures”; “Poverty of statistics”. Altman acknowledged that “South Africa’s poverty 
statistics are hotly debated partly because no single official source provides reliable and 
regular trend data.” 
With all these assertions, ranging from The Weekender’s simple speculation through 
to some commentators’ sheer scepticism, it was possible for additional politicisation of 
the debate to stand unchallenged. Thus, government’s Joel Netshitenzhe wrote: “That 
the findings of a single statistical report could tell a sharply contrasting story to those of 
many similar studies is a precise indication of how contestable statistics can be. Simply 
put, this means that, while often presented as science, statistics can be manipulated for 
multifarious purposes.” The overall picture is one of many commentators using some 
statistics to make their own case but simultaneously discrediting opponents on other 
statistical grounds. The message this sends is highly confusing. 
Where journalists did get involved in the debate, it was not to deal with the key con-
cerns or to set aside smoke and mirrors. Instead, the quality of their interventions was 
notably weak. The Weekender thumb-sucked: “Even if it were true that the poorest 10% 
or 20% of the population had got poorer, it can’t be ignored that the overall picture is 
very positive. … The gloriously rising tide … will ultimately improve the position of the 
poor, even if it has not already”. The Witness wandered off target to condemn low wages 
paid to construction workers building stadia for the 2010 world cup (“Don’t forget the 
poor”). The Citizen’s Kenny used the report to crudely argue that “(t)o get rid of poverty 
we must get rid of labour laws”. Columnist Cameron Duodu took the SAIRR claims as 
correct and proposed that more Keynesian policies were needed. 
Three non-media participants attempted to switch the terms of the debate altogether, 
rather than confront the challenges of resolving the SAIRR’s claims. In a populist 
mode, ANC MP Ben Turok expressed this in a letter published under the headline of 
“Stop nitpicking”. In his view, the debate was about marginal changes in poverty, when 
either way levels remained massive and still needed addressing, along with the issue of 
inequality. Absent from his intervention was the salient issue as to whether the poverty 
trends were going up or down. On her part, Makgetla argued: “We may never agree on 
whether the glass is half full or half empty. Maybe it would be more fruitful to replace 
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debates about the past with discussion on how to deal with poverty and social alienation 
more effectively, by finding ways to give poor communities a voice and generating mass 
economic opportunities.” Simkins raised the issue of inequality as distinct from poverty, 
and called for a “less ideologically fraught and more empirical poverty programme”. 
Avoidance of the debate’s key issues, and journalistic silence on them, meant that any 
clear settlement was not reached. Instead, the contestation ended indecisively. 
Another noteworthy feature of the debate was the participants’ shared assumption 
that it was correct to lay responsibility for poverty at the door of government. Only one 
intervention (an editorial in Die Burger) made the point that government alone could 
not solve poverty – other sectors had to take it on board. Although The Citizen’s Kenny 
simplistically blamed “our wicked labour laws”, he also said that these were drawn up 
by the “Fat Three” of government, big business and trade union bosses. Government’s 
Netshitenzhe said that it was population growth that accounted for an increase in abso-
lute figures “instead of governance failures as the SAIRR would have us believe”. The 
extent to which poor people themselves, and other social sectors including the business 
sector, shared serious responsibility or acknowledgement for steps to alleviate poverty, 
was conspicuous by omission. 
Analysis, Conclusion and Recommendations
Although the debate as a whole was in most respects unresolved, from a purely textual 
and rhetorical point, the SAIRR can perhaps be said to have ultimately emerged victo-
rious over its critics. For example, it mobilised more firepower than did government, 
and its response to critics were seldom rebutted. But this victory is not necessarily the 
case when pitted against what can be labelled as a masterframe of “ethno-nationalist” 
discourse (cf. Greenfeld, 1999: 39; Diani 1996: 1057; Entman, 1993: 53) espoused by 
Mbeki in particular. Thus, it is not at all clear in social readership terms if the SAIRR 
would have automatically prevailed over the characterisation of its members as (mainly 
white) political reactionaries with an ulterior motive. While poverty was at the centre of 
the debate, in some senses it played as a political football in a wider and even rowdier 
game. In this respect, the media was far from constituting a public sphere for reasoned 
debate that generating rational truth. It is thus unlikely that many readers would have 
ended up any the wiser in the face of such a complex statistical debate and its politicisa-
tion. On the other hand, independent and intelligible value-add by journalists could have 
produced a different outcome. Yet press coverage of this critical issue fell far short of 
what could have been delivered. 
A controversy amongst sources ought to be a prime occasion for journalists to act as 
“primary definers” of the issues, but here they barely even played a part as “secondary 
definers”. This notion of “definitional power”, as originally articulated by Hall et al 
(1978) and even as nuanced by Schlesinger (1990) and Schlesinger and Tumber (1994), 
has been used elsewhere to assess how the media, by virtue of a structured relationship 
to power, reproduce elite perspectives. While this character was evident in this case, 
it was not the case here that the result of such perspectives was the representation of a 
supposedly consensual position. Instead, contrasting alternatives were readily present, 
reflecting a transitional democracy in which general hegemonic views had not had time 
to crystallise. Only the perception of poverty as being a salient issue (and in terms of 
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which government should be judged) was shared amongst the participants. This recogni-
tion is often the case in media coverage in several other countries (see Summers, 2006). 
However, even in this regard, and as discussed further below, there were voices propos-
ing that inequality was more important than poverty. In brief, consensual discourse was 
not part of this debate.
It is relevant to note that despite the governmental attempts at spirited defence dur-
ing the row, soon after there followed the unceremonious ousting of Mbeki and most of 
his cabinet from senior positions in the ANC (and nine months later, from government 
as well). This throw of the dice was in part a function of disgruntled ANC members 
left out of the government’s policy of “Black Economic Empowerment”, and to that 
extent, a function of poor(er) people having their political say. This development took 
place outside the discourse of the SAIRR debate, and indeed most of its actors were 
probably unaware that the controversy had even taken place. It was an outcome that did 
not necessarily vindicate the Institute’s findings, as much as send a signal that the argu-
ments about poverty that had been generated in the elite press took place in a somewhat 
elevated atmosphere. 
Extra-media developments, however, in a society where class issues are arguably 
becoming more important than race in terms of social cleavage, suggest that participants, 
and especially journalists, should be aware that much as Mbeki’s ‘race-card’ view may 
have ‘trumped’ the SAIRR’s statistical claims, class in turn may ‘trump’ race. An ad-
ditional point is that it was not just a case of the press being less than a rational public 
sphere, but also that it was of a public sphere that seems to have little impact on public 
opinion. 
In the light of all this, it can be proposed that this coverage does not ultimately tell 
us much directly about power in South Africa, except by way of negative significance 
that political power resides outside of the press debate on poverty levels. Future studies 
may therefore want to assess poverty in relation to other issues – and in other media as 
well. Primary here might be a focus on representations (explicit and implicit) of class 
inequality and thence relative poverty, and not only absolute poverty, as a ‘political-
driving element’. Of course, various elites (including many journalists) may have less 
interest in organically coming up with media consideration of inequality. In addition, 
however, one might profitably look at that media which more expressly claims to reflect 
the voices of the poor, and which eschews coverage of abstract, policy-related concepts 
like “poverty” in favour of empirical tales of actual people at the ‘bottom of the pile’. In 
particular, this would point to the burgeoning tabloid newspapers in South Africa.
This is all the more important given yet another development that occurred subse-
quent to the debate – namely, xenophobic attacks where poor people (mainly young and 
male) turned on other poor people (although also on people with property – like shop-
keepers) on the basis of nationality. The media coverage of the SAIRR debate missed 
many things – and in particular it was blind to the nationality dimensions of poverty. 
Reality subsequently intruded onto this perspective, but future coverage could do well 
to pay attention to it in advance – and likewise to be sensitive to age, gender and HIV-
status aspects of poverty. 
Further research would be appropriate to investigate in more depth the “grammars 
of poverty” (Kress 1994) in terms of ascriptions of responsibility in the media, and in 
news as well as other editorial genres (see also Iyengar 1991). Going further, research 
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could also be done into the sense of responsibility amongst journalists themselves 
about representing poverty, and researching why there was such evident failure in this 
particular case. At present, the SAIRR debate in the press leaves a clear conclusion: it 
is hard to see how the media can play a role in regard to poverty if journalism remains 
as poor as it was during this incident. Summers (2006:37) writes of coverage as “a site 
of ways of knowing poverty”. In this instance, confusion rather than knowledge was an 
inevitable consequence of journalism’s inadequacy. 
Note
 1. This article has its roots in the 2008 theme of the Rhodes University School of Journalism and Media 
Studies, viz: media, poverty and social justice. It is a revised version of a paper presented on Friday 
July 25, 2008, panel on “Challenges for African media and communication research”, 26th conference 
of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, “Media and Global Divides”, 
at Stockholm University. The original paper includes a theoretical section attempting to fuse concepts 
from Framing Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis, which has been dropped for reasons of length 
and focus in this article. 
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